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Abstract
Demographic diversity might often be present in a group without group members 
noticing it. What are the epistemic effects if they do? Several  philosophers and 
social scientists have recently argued that when individuals detect demographic 
diversity in their group, this can result in epistemic benefits even if that diversity 
doesn’t involve cognitive differences. Here I critically discuss research advocating 
this proposal, introduce a distinction between two types of detection of demographic 
diversity, and apply this distinction to the theorizing on diversity in science. Focus-
ing on ‘invisible’ diversity (i.e., differences in, e.g., LGBTQ+, religious, or political 
orientation), I argue that in one common kind of group in science, if group members 
have full insight into their group’s diversity, this is likely to create epistemic costs. 
These costs can be avoided and epistemic benefits gained if group members only 
partly detect their group’s diversity. There is thus an epistemic reason for context-
dependent limitations on scientists’ insight into the diversity of their group.
Keywords Demographic diversity · Epistemic effects · Scientific groups
1 Introduction
In philosophy of science, social epistemology, and the social sciences, there has 
been much work on diversity in social groups (e.g., Wylie 2006; Rolin 2017; Grim 
et al. 2019; Muldoon 2017; Eagly 2016; Page 2017; Peters 2020). One key question 
in that area of research concerns the epistemic effects of diversity, that is, the effects 
that diversity might have on belief formation and knowledge acquisition in social 
groups.
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When considering the issue, researchers tend to distinguish between two kinds 
of diversity: cognitive diversity and demographic diversity. Cognitive diversity 
(henceforth CD)1 captures people’s differences in information, perspectives, expe-
riences, education, or thinking styles, where all these differences are relevant for a 
given task. In contrast, demographic diversity (henceforth DD)2 captures people’s 
differences with respect to how they socially identify themselves and others (e.g., 
as female, African-American, mathematician, liberal, Jewish, etc.) (Page 2017: 169; 
Phillips 2017: 227; Steel et al. 2019: 4).
While CD and DD are distinct, they can overlap in ways that are important for 
investigating the epistemic impact of diversity. For instance, DD frequently results 
in CD because membership in different social groups (e.g., gender or race) often 
comes with different task-relevant information, perspectives, or experiences. Relat-
edly, while, for example, political diversity (say, whether an individual is liberal vs. 
conservative) is primarily an instance of DD (as it is tied to how individuals socially 
self-identify), it is also often an instance of CD, namely whenever it involves task-
relevant informational differences. But political diversity isn’t always CD (as I shall 
use the terms here)3 because sometimes whether one is liberal, conservative, etc. is 
irrelevant to a given task (including normative research; Peters et al. 2020).
Focusing on task-relevant informational differences, many philosophers of sci-
ence hold that it is precisely because DD and CD are commonly connected that DD 
can be epistemically beneficial: via adding cognitive differences to a group, DD can 
enhance social criticism, help counteract biased belief formation, increase creativ-
ity, facilitate a thorough exploration of problem space, and reduce research lacunas 
(Longino 2002: 132f; Solomon 2009; Fehr 2011; Rolin 2017: 118f; Peters 2019). 
That is, many philosophers take the epistemic gains tied to DD to be mediated by 
the corresponding CD (Steel et al. 2019).
While this is a common view in philosophy of science, several researchers have 
recently proposed an interesting alternative. They argue that in a group displaying 
DD, even if there is no corresponding CD, when group members notice or perceive 
their group’s demographic diversity (henceforth DD detection), they nonetheless 
start expecting CD and social similarity/dissimilarity with others. And these expec-
tations, the argument continues, can significantly enhance information processing in 
the group (Carter and Phillips 2017; Phillips 2017; Steel et al. 2019). Call this pro-
posal the CD-independent view of the epistemic benefits of DD.
1 CD is also sometimes called ‘informational’, ‘functional’, or ‘task-related diversity’.
2 DD is also sometimes called ‘identity’ or ‘social category diversity’.
3 CD might be understood more broadly as simply capturing differences in perspectives, experiences, 
etc., i.e., without the additional point that these differences are also task relevant. We could then dis-
tinguish two kinds of CD: (i) CD involving task-relevant informational differences and (ii) CD involv-
ing task-irrelevant informational differences. However, to streamline the discussion, I shall here set (ii) 
aside and use the term ‘CD’ to specifically refer to CD (i) only. Having said that, it is worth noting (and 
will become clear in due course) that much of what I shall say below on the CD-independent epistemic 
benefits of DD carries over to CD (ii) too (i.e., there are CD (i)-independent epistemic benefits of CD 
(ii) too). The argument below can thus also be viewed as a challenge to much philosophical and social 
scientific research on CD which assumes what Page (2017) calls a “basic logic”: “For cognitive diversity 
to produce a bonus, it must be germane to the task” (169).
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Here I want to take a closer look at the CD-independent view. While I’m sym-
pathetic to the proposal, I shall argue that in recent research on the CD-independ-
ent view – specifically in Carter and Phillips (2017) and Steel et al. (2019) – DD 
detection remains largely unanalyzed, and this results in unwarranted claims about 
the epistemic impact of diversity. To guard against such claims, two different kinds 
of DD detection should be distinguished, what I shall call partial and specific DD 
detection, which capture different degrees of insight into the distribution of DD 
within a group. Applying this distinction (further specified below) to the theorizing 
on diversity in groups in science, I contend that in one common kind of scientific 
group, if group members have full insight into the DD of their group, this is likely to 
create epistemic costs. I argue that these costs can be avoided and epistemic benefits 
gained if group members only partly detect the group’s DD. There is thus an epis-
temic reason for context-dependent limitations on scientists’ insight into the diver-
sity of their group.
In arguing for these claims and analyzing DD detection, I will focus a type of DD 
that strikes me as intriguing but has so far been largely overlooked in philosophical 
research: While philosophers working on diversity have focused predominantly only 
on “visible” DD (e.g., gender or race diversity) or CD (Steel et al. 2019: 15; Long-
ino 2002: 132f; Page 2017: 169; Pöyhönen 2017), there is also what some social 
scientists call “invisible” DD (Clair et al. 2005; Lambert and Bell 2013: 23f). It cap-
tures differences in social identity that are difficult to discern in face-to-face interac-
tions, for instance, variance in sexual orientation (LGBTQ+), religious conviction, 
political ideology, socio-economics status, etc. While the term ‘invisible’ might be 
too strong, it is clear enough that unlike, say, gender or ethnicity, these differences 
can’t usually be swiftly read off, for example, from a subject’s physiology or name, 
and they are often deliberately concealed (Clair et al. 2005; Shields and Dunn 2016; 
Peters et al. 2020). Importantly, invisible DD isn’t the same as CD: group members’ 
invisible DD frequently involves differences in information, perspectives, and so on 
that are irrelevant to group tasks, whereas CD (as I use the term here) only cap-
tures task-relevant differences in information, perspectives, etc. (see also Page 2017: 
169; Phillips 2017: 227). Since there is evidence that scientific groups often display 
at least some invisible DD (Ecklund et  al. 2016; Shields and Dunn 2016; Barres 
2018), if, as the CD-independent view suggests, DD detection can be epistemically 
beneficial, then this might provide steering committees of scientific groups with an 
epistemic rationale for making invisible features of DD in their groups more salient 
to group members. Exploring the effects of DD detection is thus important to deter-
mine whether it would promote or hinder epistemic success in science.
To make progress on this front, I begin in section 2 by introducing the key argu-
ments that have been proposed for the CD-independent view. In sections 3 to 5, I 
then discuss recent research advocating the CD-independent view before distin-
guishing two kinds of DD detection. In sections 6 and 7, I apply the distinction to 
the theorizing on diversity in scientific groups and address potential objections to 
the approach to DD detection developed in the preceding sections.
Three clarifications should be mentioned. Firstly, I use terms such as ‘detect-
ing’ and ‘noticing’ DD broadly: While they are typically factive, here their ref-
erents include merely perceiving or forming beliefs about DD, which needn’t be 
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veridical or true, respectively. Thus construed, detecting or noticing DD (e.g., 
gender and race differences) needn’t always involve tracking pre-existing prop-
erties of individuals but might involve socially constructing or conferring them 
(Ásta 2018). By using terms in this way, I wish to remain neutral on the ontology 
of social identities (gender, race, etc.).
Secondly, when considering the epistemic costs and benefits related to DD 
detection, one needs to make assumptions about what ‘epistemic benefits’ are. 
This will depend on one’s preferred epistemic commitments (e.g., whether one 
is a virtue epistemologist, epistemic deontologist, or epistemic consequential-
ist). Here I adopt a veritistic version of epistemic consequentialism, according to 
which a practice P is epistemically beneficial in a particular way W for a subject/
group S in context C if P facilitates the acquisition of true beliefs of interest for S 
in C.
Finally, notice that even if P is epistemically beneficial in some way W in C, 
this is not to say that it is epistemically good all-things-considered. For it might 
still be epistemically costly in other ways and other considerations (e.g., moral, 
prudential, etc.) might outweigh the epistemic benefit(s) of adopting P in C. 
Relatedly, the epistemic reason for context-dependent limitations on scientists’ 
insight into the diversity of their group that I shall introduce is defeasible; it 
might be overridden by other considerations. Having said that, as will become 
clear below, it is significant and should be taken into account when reflecting on 
how to design epistemically successful groups in science.
2  Arguments for the CD‑independent view
While many researchers suggest that DD needs to involve task-relevant cognitive 
differences to produce epistemic gains (Longino 2002: 130, 134f; Antony 2016; 
Page 2017: 169), on the basis of empirical studies, some social scientists and 
philosophers have recently maintained otherwise. For instance, Phillips and her 
colleagues (Phillips and Loyd 2006; Loyd et al. 2013; Carter and Phillips 2017) 
have argued that DD in a group can improve epistemic group performance with-
out being connected to CD – at least as long as group members also detect the 
group’s DD. Phillips et al.’s arguments for this proposal, i.e., the CD-independent 
view, have also been related to the theorizing on diversity in philosophy of sci-
ence (Steel et al. 2019). They will occupy center stage in the discussion on DD 
detection below. I will thus now briefly introduce Phillips et al.’s two main con-
siderations and empirical support for the CD-independent view. In outline, they 
are as follows (see Phillips and Loyd 2006; Loyd et al. 2013; Carter and Phillips 
2017):
(1) Even in the absence of CD, when people detect DD in their group, this can 
be epistemically beneficial in generating expectations of cognitive differences 
that  sharpen people’s information processing and prime them for new ideas. 
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For instance, studies found that, compared to controls, white jurors in a racially 
diverse group raised more novel case facts, made fewer errors in their discus-
sion of the case, and identified more missing data in the deliberation on a case 
than white jurors in homogeneous juries (Sommers 2006). Similarly, following 
group discussion on controversial issues, white subjects showed more sophisti-
cated thinking in essay-writing tasks when assigned to a discussion group with 
a black minority-opinion holder than when assigned to an all-white group with 
a white minority opinion holder (Antonio et al. 2004). Moreover, subjects who 
anticipated entering a demographically homogeneous group meeting were found 
to prepare less thoroughly for the meeting than those anticipating a diverse group 
(Loyd et al. 2013). Interpreting the data, Phillips (2017) argues that subjects 
in homogeneous groups are less attentive to task-relevant information because 
they expect agreement and smooth interaction in the group whereas subjects in 
diverse groups expect disagreement and divergent views, prompting them to be 
more sensitive to novel information and to think more carefully.
(2) Even in the absence of CD, when people notice DD in their group, this can be 
epistemically beneficial in that it reduces group members’ unwarranted attribu-
tions of credibility and trust to identity-similar others while also making them 
more tolerant of disagreement, more confident about articulating dissent, and 
more focused on a given task. The reason has to do with “similarity-attraction”: 
studies suggest that people are attracted to, seek alignment with, and expect 
agreement from similar subjects, which can incline them to take identity-similar 
group members to be more credible and trustworthy than identity-dissimilar 
members even when this is unjustified (Carter and Phillips 2017). In homog-
enous groups, this process can make subjects reluctant to express dissenting 
views, which then contributes to epistemic in-group conformity. In contrast, in 
diverse groups, people are less affected by similarity-attraction, and this makes 
them more willing to express disagreement and to focus on the task, as they are 
less concerned about social bonding. Experiments found, for instance, that in 
a group of students, when a member of the demographic majority in the group 
expressed a different view than the rest, in homogeneous groups, subjects dis-
played a stronger aversion against disagreement and engaged less in a given task 
than in diverse groups (Phillips and Loyd 2006). That is, diverse groups showed 
greater task engagement and facilitated more persistent and confident expres-
sions of disagreements.
While (1) and (2) provide plausible motivations for the CD-independent view, in 
the remainder I shall argue that some recent research that is built on these points is 
problematic. I begin by scrutinizing philosophical work by Steel et al. (2019) before 
critiquing Phillips et al.’s own account of diversity based on (1) and (2). The ration-
ale for and goal of the following critical discussion is not to provide conclusive 
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objections to other researchers’ work on the CD-independent view but to help take it 
further and elucidate the nature of epistemically beneficial DD detection.
3  From the epistemic benefits of DD to epistemic injustice
In philosophy of science, Steel et  al. (2019) argue that even without CD, due to 
“cognitive diversity expectation” (i.e., the mechanism described in (1)) and “in-
group epistemic conformity” (i.e., the mechanism described in (2)), DD can be 
epistemically beneficial in science by contributing to “information elaboration”, the 
“process whereby knowledge dispersed in a group is elicited and examined” (8). 
Steel et al. maintain that (a) several philosophical accounts of diversity have so far 
overlooked this possibility, i.e., that DD may improve group performance indepen-
dently of CD. Moreover, Steel et al. hold that (b) this CD-independent effect of DD 
suggests a “potential divergence of epistemic and equity-based rationales for diver-
sity” (2019: 16). I agree with Steel et al. on (a) and shall set it aside. I want to focus 
on (b). Steel et al. maintain that the two mechanisms that in their view account for 
the CD-independent benefits of DD, namely CD expectation and in-group epistemic 
conformity involve epistemic injustice, and so epistemic benefits of diversity can 
be epistemically unjust. Steel et al. support their claim with two arguments. One of 
them provides me with a helpful starting point for analyzing the cognition that is 
involved in epistemically beneficial DD detection. I will thus now briefly introduce 
and assess it.
Steel et al.’s (2019: 14f) argument can be summarized as follows:
(P1) DD in a group can lead group members who detect it to expect CD, and 
this CD expectation is epistemically beneficial in priming the group members 
to potential intersubjective disagreements, causing them to assess information 
more carefully and be more susceptible to new ideas.
(P2) The CD expectation mechanism (wherein group members transition 
from DD detection to CD expectation) involves a “tendency to stereotype in 
which noticeable markers of social identity are treated as accurate predictors 
of beliefs, knowledge, perspectives, and so on” (Steel et al. 2019: 15).
(P3) Such stereotyping can be epistemically unjust (ibid: 16).
(C) So, DD can result in epistemic benefits that can be epistemically unjust.
Steel et  al. take the support for (P1) from Phillips et  al.’s empirical work. And 
they add (P2) as an intuitively plausible assumption without providing further 
support.
There is reason to be cautious about this assumption, however. For instance, 
Carter and Phillips (2017) note that while the CD expectations underlying the epis-
temic benefits of DD do rest on “social categorization whereby individuals make 
in-group and out-group distinctions”, the social categorization involved can take 
two different pathways (8). On one pathway, Carter and Phillips argue, it activates 
“stereotypes” and “intergroup bias”, i.e., the tendency to display in-group favor-
itism vs. out-group derogation, which is likely to happen in competitive environ-
ments, when group identity is threatened or when strong social ‘fault-lines’ persist, 
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i.e., when group members align along demographic characteristics causing a group 
to divide into homogeneous subgroups (ibid). Crucially, when social categorization 
is taking this “first pathway”, then detrimental group processes marked by a “lack of 
trust”, “failure to adequately attend” to out-group members, and “interpersonal con-
flict, avoidance behaviors, and communication problems will emerge and ultimately 
undermine group performance”, Carter and Phillips (2017: 8-9) hold. They argue 
that it is only on the “second pathway”, which, on their view, involves social catego-
rization that does not implicate stereotyping, that DD detection triggers expectations 
of CD that strengthen epistemic performance: it is only then that these expectations 
also involve the type of motivational mindset that prompts people to uncover and 
appreciate unique information, conduct a careful analysis, and invest effort in per-
spective taking when processing claims (ibid).4 These prima facie plausible points 
don’t yet undermine Steel et al.’s assumption that stereotyping can produce the epis-
temic benefits appealed to in (P1). They do, however, indicate that this assumption is 
in need of support.
Consider now (P3). Steel et al. (2019: 16) make (again) only an existential claim: 
in some cases, stereotyping can be an ‘epistemic injustice’, which they specify by 
referring to Pohlhaus (2017: 21), who writes that stereotyping is an epistemic injus-
tice if it involves (a) “pernicious stereotypes”, (b) a “potential unfair bias through 
which [subjects’] epistemic activities may be received”, or if it (c) “impede[s] their 
epistemic activity in comparison to those who are not perniciously stereotyped”. 
Notice that if stereotyping involves only treating “noticeable markers of social iden-
tity as accurate predictors of beliefs, knowledge, perspectives, etc.” (Steel et  al. 
2019: 15), then that by itself does not yet link it to (a), (b), or (c), i.e., to an unequal, 
unfair, or unwarranted trait ascription. Call a tendency to treat certain  noticeable 
markers of social identity automatically as accurate predictors of certain beliefs, etc., 
neutral stereotyping. Call a tendency that is the same but additionally also involves 
(a), (b), or (c) (and might implicate positive stereotypes) loaded stereotyping.
Given this distinction, what about Steel et al.’s claim that in the cases when the 
CD-expectation mechanism involves epistemically unjust, that is, loaded stereotyp-
ing, it can still lead to the kind of epistemic benefits mentioned in (P1)? Steel et al. 
rest content with the intuitive plausibility of the point. Yet, there is reason to doubt it. 
For instance, in a set of studies, van Dijk et al. (2018) found that “information elabo-
ration” in diverse teams (N = 97), which Steel et al. explicitly take to be epistemi-
cally beneficial per se and important to preserve (see Steel et al. 2019: 6f), had itself 
negative epistemic effects in groups with inaccurate competence attributions: the 
4 But can social categorization even occur without stereotyping? Carter and Phillips don’t support this 
assumption. It is, however, independently well motivated (Liberman et al. 2017). For instance, develop-
mental psychologists found that “experimentally inducing essentialist beliefs about a novel social cat-
egory […] did not lead” 4–6-year-olds to the “out-group dislike that defines social prejudice” (Rhodes 
et  al. 2018: 1). Similarly, neuroscientific studies with adults measuring event-related brain potentials 
found a “dissociation between the perceptual encoding of race and subsequent activation of associated 
stereotypes” that indicated a “clear conceptual distinction between categorization and stereotyping” and 
suggests that the “encoding of racial category need not result in stereotype activation” (Ito and Tomelleri 
2017: 758).
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disparately high influence of subjects who were inaccurately viewed as more com-
petent inhibited group performance as the information-elaboration process focused 
on less reliable input than when accurate social perceptions were involved. Impor-
tantly, the competence attributions in van Dijk et al.’s study were based on loaded 
“stereotypes”: on “expected higher performance from women working on emotional 
tasks compared to math tasks, while for men this pattern was reversed” (2018: 8). 
The data thus challenge Steel et al.’s claim that when DD detection involves stereo-
type-based unequal, unfair, or unwarranted trait (e.g., trustworthiness) ascription to 
out-group vs. in-group individuals, this might produce epistemic benefits related to 
information elaboration. Van Dijk et al.’s findings put pressure on this view because 
they suggest that inaccurate attributions of low credibility to stereotyped individu-
als weakened group performance by contributing to group members’ oversight of 
potentially corrective contributions offered by those stereotyped.
The data don’t yet preclude Steel et al.’s claim that DD detection implicating ste-
reotyping can be both epistemically unjust and epistemically beneficial. But  since 
Steel et al. haven’t offered argumentative support for this claim5 and Van Dijk et al.’s 
findings provide reasons to doubt it, there is ground to remain skeptical that when 
DD detection triggers CD expectations based on loaded stereotypes, the epistemic 
benefits appealed to in (P1) might still arise. That is, Steel et  al.’s  view that DD 
can result in CD-independent  epistemic benefits that are also epistemically unjust 
remains insufficiently supported.
To further investigate the nature of epistemically beneficial DD detection and its 
link to stereotyping and social categorization more generally, I will now consider 
Phillips et  al.’s proposal on how DD detection yields CD-independent epistemic 
gains. As it turns out, this proposal too is not unproblematic.
4  Is social categorization necessary for epistemically beneficial DD 
detection?
Carter and Phillips (2017) “argue that social categorization and resulting forces of 
similarity attraction are necessary prerequisites for eliciting beneficial information 
and decision-making processes that enhance group performance [emphasis origi-
nal]” (9). Importantly, for Carter and Phillips, in each particular group in which DD 
has CD-independent epistemic benefits, the required social categorization in the 
group is one “whereby individuals make in-group and out-group distinctions so that 
out-group members are viewed as more different from the self, and in-group mem-
bers are seen as more similar” (ibid: 6). That is, individuals of a diverse group need 
to classify specific group members in terms of their specific in-group vs. out-group 
5 To argue that CD-independent epistemic benefits can be epistemically unjust, Steel et al. also consider 
other mechanisms that don’t involve stereotyping, for instance, that DD might counteract conformity in 
which people feel that members of their own identity group should be in agreement with one another. 
This mechanism doesn’t depend on stereotyping out-groups. My focus here is only on Steel et al.’s point 
concerning stereotyping, however.
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features via “salient characteristics such as age, race, gender, and organizational 
membership, as well as other dimensions that may be meaningful within the given 
social context” (ibid: 3).
Carter and Phillips’ proposal seems natural. It arguably also underlies Steel 
et al.’s view that CD expectations based on DD detection are “plausibly explained 
by a human tendency to stereotype” others (2019: 15); after all, stereotyping is 
one form of social categorization. Steel et al. don’t hold that social categorization 
is necessary for the CD-independent epistemic benefits of DD, however. But inde-
pendently of whether social categorization is assumed to be necessary for or just 
to plausibly explain the CD-expectation mechanism, I shall now argue that there is 
an alternative basis of CD-expectations and the related epistemic benefits of DD. 
Specifically (pace Carter and Phillips), for CD-independent, DD-detection related 
epistemic benefits to arise, group members don’t need to identify each other in terms 
of their specific demographic characteristics and draw individual specific similarity 
vs. dissimilarity distinctions among each other. Relatedly, the emergence of epis-
temically beneficial CD-expectations can plausibly be explained without assuming 
an involvement of loaded (or neutral) stereotyping of specific individuals. 
To see this, consider a group of people who display what I earlier called ‘invis-
ible’ DD, that is, they exhibit demographic differences that are difficult to recognize 
in face-to-face interactions and result from self-identification (or social construc-
tion) in terms of sexual orientation, religion, political identity, socio-economics sta-
tus, academic discipline, etc. (Clair et al. 2005; Lambert and Bell 2013: 23f). Sup-
pose that while group members are unaware of the group’s invisible DD, the group 
leader, L, knows of it. L then informs the group that the group is demographically 
diverse in the mentioned respects but doesn’t yet tell them about the specific distri-
bution of that diversity in the group. So L doesn’t tell the group about each individ-
ual’s particular sexual orientation, religion, political identity, and so on. Assuming 
that the group members accept L’s claim about their group’s composition, what are 
the likely epistemic effects?
While they now know that they are in a group with significant DD, the group 
members can’t categorize or stereotype each other with respect to the particular 
demographic differences just mentioned. They lack the specific distributional infor-
mation. Correspondingly, when interacting with each other, they won’t be able to 
draw an individual-specific similar vs. dissimilar distinction with respect to the 
demographic dimensions at issue (though other dimensions, e.g., gender or ethnic-
ity, might still be accessible for that purpose). And while the group members might, 
independently of what L told them, be looking for subtle cues to identify ‘who-is-
who’ in terms of the demographic features at issue, they won’t be certain in each 
particular case. Since the subjects involved can’t confidently tell the relevant differ-
ences among each other, the insight into these differences provides them with little 
basis to be more socially drawn to or repelled from some specific group member but 
not others. Thus, with respect to the differences at issue, processes of individual-
specific social categorization, stereotyping, and similarity-attraction are suspended.
Yet, among group members, there should still be a reduced concern about their 
social relationships and so greater task-focus as well as an increased expectation of 
disagreement, contributing to an uncovering of unique information, careful analysis, 
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and effort in perspective taking, boosting problem-solving and creativity. This is 
because each group member now knows that the group as a whole is demographi-
cally diverse and so they have reason to expect differences in opinion in social inter-
actions. The CD-independent epistemic benefits of DD mentioned above should 
thus still arise. After all, for all that each individual can tell the subject they are 
interacting with might be either an out-group or an in-group member with respect 
to the demographic features at issue. Since they can’t tell either way, the uncertainty 
induced should diminish subjects’ relationship focus, increase their attention to 
the task, and prime them to potential disagreements, sharpening their information 
processing.
There is empirical support for this. Levine et al. (2014) asked subjects to engage 
in (fictional) real estate trading with each other online. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to either an ethnically homogenous or an ethnically diverse market, i.e., 
group. Importantly, subjects knew of the ethnical homogeneity (in one condition) 
or ethical diversity (in another condition) in their groups but, while trading, couldn’t 
see each other and didn’t know which trader made a certain bid or offer. Subjects in 
the diverse-group condition were thus in the kind of context outlined in the hypo-
thetical scenario above. They knew (invisible/task-irrelevant) DD was present, but 
didn’t know who belonged to which demographic group.
Interestingly, in the homogenous-group condition, even those with superior pric-
ing skills were likely to commit pricing errors, buying and selling above true value, 
and traders were more likely to accept speculative prices. In contrast, subjects in the 
diverse-group condition reliably priced assets closer to true values (“market prices 
fitted true values 58% better”); they were less likely to accept inflated offers and 
more likely to accept offers that were closer to true value (Levine et al. 2014: 1). 
These data suggest that in diverse groups, the kind of DD detection envisaged above 
resulted in enhanced deliberation and epistemic benefits of the type that  Phillips 
et al. and Steel et al. highlight.
Now, these effects might be explained (as Levine et al. 2014 do) by holding that 
in homogenous (vs. diverse) groups subjects place greater and unwarranted trust in 
similar others (vs. dissimilar others, respectively). Notice, however, that the study 
didn’t measure trust attributions, and it is equally plausible that the effects arose 
because subjects in diverse groups anticipated competition6 and assumed that their 
interactants were more knowledgeable than them, for instance, due to their different 
viewpoints.7 Either way, the results clearly suggest that (1) social categorization of 
specific individuals that one is interacting with is not required for the kind of CD-
independent epistemic benefits discussed, and that (2) their emergence can be plau-
sibly explained without invoking stereotyping.
7 The assumption of informational differences of dissimilar others could also account for a potential 
diminished trust in dissimilar other. Crucially, such a reduced trust-attribution wouldn’t be epistemically 
unjust: it wouldn’t be unfair but simply overly cautious based on an exaggerated positive view of the 
interactants’ epistemic profile.
6 According to Carter and Phillips, in a competitive context, social categorization should produce nega-
tive epistemic outcomes. Levine et al.’s experiment involved such a context; yet, it revealed positive out-
comes. While the data challenge Carter and Phillips’ view, they are to be expected on the view proposed 
here: since subjects lacked specific insights into the distribution of DD in their groups, competition didn’t 
produce the negative effects tied to inter-group bias, out-group distrust, etc.
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To further motivate the view that the benefits at issue aren’t necessarily depend-
ent on being less attracted to or trusting in dissimilar vs. similar others, consider 
again the hypothetical example from above involving group leader L. Suppose that, 
unlike before, now the group at issue consists of subjects who are equally affec-
tively nonchalant towards demographically dissimilar vs. similar members. Suppose 
too that while the group members believe that demographic differences influence 
people’s information processing and behavior, they are unaware that their group is 
highly demographically diverse. Suppose finally that, as before, L then informs the 
group members that their group is vastly demographically diverse. But they again 
can’t detect the specific distribution of that diversity among each other.
Since they believe that DD influences people’s information processing and behav-
ior, in subsequent interactions, each group member is likely to display an increased 
task-focus while also being primed to task-relevant differences. For unlike before 
when they were completely ignorant of the DD at issue, group members now have 
a positive reason to expect dissent and become the target of criticism – a position 
one arguably doesn’t want to be in no matter who is the source of the critique. Since 
these subjects are now by assumption equally affectively indifferent towards demo-
graphically dissimilar vs. similar members, the resulting epistemic benefits related 
to enhanced task-focus and sensitivity to task-relevant differences are independent of 
similarity-attraction.
This challenges Carter and Phillips’ (2017) proposal that social categorization 
involving similarity-attraction is necessary for the type of CD-independent epis-
temic benefits of DD at issue here. Because even though the preceding considera-
tions are subject to future empirical testing, they are prima facie plausible. Given the 
absence of counterevidence, there is thus a basis for assuming that the relevant epis-
temic benefits don’t require social categorization in which a subject views herself as 
similar/dissimilar from her interactant(s) and can occur, and be plausibly explained, 
without such a categorization, including stereotyping.
5  Two types of DD detection
The discussion of Carter and Phillips’, and Steel et  al.’s views on the features of 
epistemically beneficial DD detection is instructive. It provides a rationale for distin-
guishing two different types of DD detection:
(1) partial DD detection, which occurs when group members learn that their group 
is demographically diverse in various ways but still lack an insight into the spe-
cific distribution of that diversity among individual group members (i.e., they 
can’t categorize each other with respect to the relevant demographic aspects); 
and
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(2) specific DD detection, which occurs when group members learn that their group 
is demographically diverse in various ways and they also have an insight into the 
specific distribution of that diversity in the group (i.e., they can categorize each 
other with respect to the relevant demographic aspects).
Both (1) and (2) should be distinguished from (i) the presence and (ii) the use 
of DD within a group. For DD might be present in a group and the members 
of that group might register and use information from demographically diverse 
sources in their group (e.g., for the purpose of solving a problem) without yet 
being aware that the group is indeed demographically diverse. This point is high-
lighted by the fact that the diversity at issue might be invisible.
The distinctions between (1) and (2) and between the presence, use, and detec-
tion of DD in a group help refine the investigation of the epistemic impact of 
diversity. They enable us to ask, for instance, whether and, if so, how the impact 
of the presence of DD in a group is affected by group members’ noticing that 
the group is demographically diverse. We can thus distinguish first-order ques-
tions about the epistemic impact of diversity, that is, questions about the epis-
temic effects of processing information from diverse sources, from second-order 
questions, questions about the epistemic effects of processing information about a 
group’s diversity itself. Keeping these two types of questions apart and exploring 
the interplay between the types of effects that they pertain to will be important to 
attain a comprehensive picture of the epistemic impact of diversity.
Notice too that given the difference between the two kinds of DD detection, 
DD in a group might result in different kinds of epistemic effects depending on 
what type of DD detection occurs. One of them might be more epistemically ben-
eficial in one context or group than in another. The distinction should thus be 
kept in mind when exploring the epistemic impact of diversity. To illustrate its 
explanatory fruitfulness further, I will now apply this distinction in the theorizing 
on the epistemic effects of DD in groups in science.
6  DD detection in scientific groups
To make the discussion more tractable, I shall focus on a particular kind of group 
of scientists, namely groups of scientists who
(a) have been brought together to collaborate by a steering committee,
(b) don’t yet have extensive experience working in demographically highly diverse 
environments,
(c) aren’t yet familiar with each other, and
(d) display various aspects of DD that is task-irrelevant and invisible but known to 
the group’s steering committee.
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So while the selected scientists do also vary in visible DD (e.g., gender and race), 
they mostly differ in that they belong to, say, different sexual (e.g., LGBTQ+), reli-
gious (e.g., Christian vs. atheist), and political (e.g., liberal vs. conservative) orien-
tations as well as academic disciplines (e.g., a scientist with a degree in philosophy). 
And all these aspects of their social identity are both difficult to notice by each group 
member and not pertinent to the performance of the task that the group is given.
As noted earlier, scientific groups often do contain at least some degree of such 
invisible DD (see, e.g., Ecklund et al. 2016; Shields and Dunn 2016; Barres 2018). 
Especially in international research institutions focusing on grant-based, fixed-
term projects investigating scientific problems that lend themselves to interdiscipli-
nary approaches, groups of the kind described are likely to be common. Given the 
increasing calls for a general diversification of academia, they are likely to become 
more common in the future (e.g., Medin et al. 2017; Stewart and Valian 2018). For 
ease of exposition, I shall refer to groups meeting (a)-(d) as demographically diverse 
scientific groups (DDS groups) for short.
Since the members of DDS groups don’t yet notice most of their group’s diver-
sity, what would be the epistemic effects if their steering committee facilitated either 
specific or partial DD detection within the group? To address the question, I shall 
develop the following argument:
(P1) In DDS groups operating in social condition C, which involves social 
environments in which individuals’ social expectations are shaped by compe-
tition, threats to group identity, and/or strong social fault-lines, specific DD 
detection is likely to create significant epistemic costs whereas partial DD 
detection helps avoid these costs and can also result in epistemic benefits.
(P2) DDS groups often operate in C.
(C) So, DDS groups often operate in a condition in which specific DD detec-
tion is likely to create significant epistemic costs whereas partial DD detection 
helps avoid these costs and can also result in epistemic benefits.
Notice that the argument is neutral on whether partial DD detection is overall, 
all things considered, more epistemically beneficial than specific DD detection. It is 
compatible with the view that the overall benefits (epistemic or otherwise) of spe-
cific DD detection outweigh those of partial DD detection. Despite these qualifica-
tions, if correct, the argument will still provide one hitherto unexplored epistemic 
reason in favor of adopting partial rather than specific DD detection in DDS groups 
that should be considered when theorizing about the epistemic impact of diversity in 
science.
What, then, is the support for (P1) and (P2)? As for (P1), Phillips et al.’s points 
(1) and (2) (from section  2 above) provide plausible reasons for holding that DD 
detection can produce significant CD-independent epistemic benefits by giving rise 
to CD expectations. A steering committee in charge of DDS groups has thus epis-
temic grounds to consider facilitating DD detection in their groups.
Recall too, however, that in social environments with competition, threats to 
group identity, and/or strong social fault-lines, specific DD detection is likely to lead 
to negative epistemic results. For the social categorizations that in such a situation 
(i.e., in social condition C) underlie people’s CD expectations is likely to activate 
 European Journal for Philosophy of Science           (2021) 11:33 
1 3
  33  Page 14 of 21
intergroup bias, inclining group members to display a lack of trust and failures to 
adequately attend to out-group members, contributing to interpersonal conflict, 
avoidance behaviors, and so on. All of which weaken the epistemic performance of 
the group (see section 3). A DDS-group steering committee has thus epistemic rea-
sons to avoid facilitating specific DD detection in C.
Importantly, however, a group in C need not yet forego the CD-independent 
epistemic benefits tied to DD detection. This is because, as argued above, for these 
kinds of benefits to arise, partial DD detection can be sufficient (e.g., Levine et al.’s 
(2014) study provided empirical support for this and offered a concrete example). 
And crucially, partial DD detection doesn’t yet involve enough insight into the social 
identity of group members to allow for an individual-specific in-group vs. out-group 
distinction. Hence, facilitating partial DD detection in DDS groups in C can allow a 
steering committee to reap DD-related CD-independent epistemic benefits without 
incurring the epistemic costs of specific DD detection. This supports (P1).8
Turning now to (P2), in what kind of social environment(s) do DDS groups oper-
ate? Two points are worth noting. Firstly, it is well known that scientists frequently 
compete for funding, recognition, and authority (Fang and Casadevall 2015). And 
while competition isn’t negative per se (e.g., it can help keep individual scholars’ 
confirmation bias in check; Ridley 2012), many researchers have noted that the 
sciences currently often involve “over-competitiveness” (Carson et  al. 2013: 184), 
which has adverse effects “undermining resource sharing, research integrity, and 
creativity” (Fang and Casadevall 2015: 1229).
Secondly, there is evidence that scientists often display pronounced intergroup 
biases creating strong social fault-lines. For instance, Kirby et al. (2019) explored 
the “perceptual barriers” to scientific collaboration in teams crossing the boundary 
between the natural sciences and the social sciences. They found that, for instance, 
earth scientists (N = 449) “perceived social science/scientists as significantly less 
competent than natural science/scientists” (Kirby et al. 2019: 1). Similarly, Urban-
ska et al. (2019) surveyed 280 scientists and found that “in line with the intergroup 
bias literature, group membership in the more prestigious hard sciences is related to 
a stronger tendency to downplay the intellectual contribution of social science disci-
plines compared to other hard science disciplines” (1).
It is also well known that scientists often display intergroup biases when it comes 
to, for instance, race, gender, sexual, political, and religious orientation. For exam-
ple, studies found that many scientists in the US are biased against Black and Latin-x 
post-doctoral candidates for STEM research positions (Eaton et al. 2019: 127). And 
in the STEM sector, LGBTQ+ researchers sometimes face aversive reactions from 
their straight colleagues (Cech and Pham 2017). Indeed, some data indicate that 
about 1/3 of physical scientists from sexual and gender minorities (i.e., LGBTQ+) 
8 In some groups, specific DD detection is epistemically valuable by providing group members with 
cues about others’ expertise or reliability on certain issues (e.g., when in exploring AI-enhanced human 
cognition, one learns that a group member is both a psychologist and computer scientist). But the focus 
here is on DDS groups, and so the invisible aspects of DD at issue are (by assumption) task-irrelevant 
(see condition (d)). This means that specific DD detection of these aspects wouldn’t help group members 
to track relevant expertise among each other.
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in, for example, the UK have “considered leaving their jobs because of their work-
place climate” (Gibney 2019: 16). Surveys also found that many scientists display 
an explicit willingness to discriminate against peers belonging to certain Christian 
groups (Yancey 2011; Barnes et al. 2020). And in several studies, both politically 
liberal and conservative researchers in the social sciences and humanities reported 
hostility and bias against colleagues with the opposite political orientation (Inbar 
and Lammers 2012; Shields and Dunn 2016; Honeycutt and Freberg 2017; Peters 
et al. 2020).
In sum, there is ground to suspect that scientists often operate under conditions of 
competition and harbour various inter-group biases against other members of their 
own and other fields. That is, individuals in scientific groups often operate in condi-
tion C. Since there is little reason to believe that DDS groups are different in this 
respect, in the absence of counterevidence, we have an inductive basis to assume 
(P2).
Both (P1) and (P2) are now in place and so (C) is supported. That is, DDS groups 
often operate in a condition in which specific DD detection is likely to create sig-
nificant epistemic costs whereas partial DD detection can avoid these costs and also 
produce epistemic benefits. The argument for (C) provides steering committees of 
DDS groups with an epistemic reason for facilitating partial DD detection and limit-
ing the opportunities for specific DD detection in the groups. Call this the partial 
DD detection approach to diversity.
7  Four objections and clarifications
Objection 1 Focusing on a key assumption underlying the partial DD detection 
approach, whether or not DD detection in DDS groups will generate epistemic ben-
efits remains an open empirical question. This is because not just any DD is likely 
to trigger the type of mechanisms leading to epistemic benefits discussed, including 
expectations of CD and disagreement. The kinds of DD that are of interest are only 
the ones that have a significant impact on people’s social experiences and so provide 
a reason to expect CD and disagreement. Furthermore, the studies mentioned in sec-
tion 2 pertain only to visible diversity and the partial DD detection approach con-
cerns invisible DD. Hence, they provide little support for this approach.
Response While we don’t yet have relevant data specifically on DDS groups, some 
studies suggest that even the detection of aspects of invisible DD that are irrelevant 
to social experience and CD can produce the type of epistemic benefits at issue here: 
Phillips and Loyd (2006) told students that they would be working in teams of three 
to make a decision about the best company for another company to acquire. In one 
condition, subjects were informed that the two other team members were living on 
the same north/south side of campus as them (homogenous group  condition). In 
another condition (diverse group condition), subjects were informed that only one 
was living there. Surprisingly, simply knowing of shared north/south accommoda-
tion location caused many subjects to expect viewpoint-similarity in the entirely 
unrelated task of deciding which company was best to acquire. And when a member 
 European Journal for Philosophy of Science           (2021) 11:33 
1 3
  33  Page 16 of 21
of the demographic majority expressed a different view, in homogeneous groups, 
many subjects also had more negative feelings toward disagreement and engaged 
less in the task than in diverse groups. Since in this study an invisible aspect of 
diversity (i.e., subjects’ living north vs. south of campus) was made salient that has 
arguably a minor, if any, impact on people’s social experiences and CD, the experi-
ment provides evidence that DD detection of that type can still produce the kind 
of CD-independent epistemic benefits discussed. The study by Levine et al. (2014) 
reviewed above offers another example. It too found that the partial detection of 
invisible DD (i.e., when individual-specific ethnicity was unknown) yielded epis-
temic benefits without that diversity being relevant to the task (i.e., real-estate trad-
ing). Since we have little reason to assume that in DDS groups, the results will be 
different, these data help address Objection 1.
Objection 2 The partial DD detection approach is rarely relevant and hardly feasi-
ble. For instance, in most scientific groups, the social categories of group members 
(gender, race, etc.) are typically already well known to others, or become quickly 
salient in face-to-face interactions: in most scientific groups, even when it comes to 
invisible DD in DDS groups, scientists are likely to inadvertently signal their invis-
ible social identity to their collaborators via the content of their contributions, style, 
conduct, language, etc.
Response Even with respect to visible features such as sex and race, recognition 
of the related demographic differences isn’t always easy. There are, for instance, 
trans-women/men or subjects with different multi-racial backgrounds whose dis-
tinctive  demograpic or social category  is difficult to perceive. Additionally, just 
as people in general, scientists often naturally differ along dimensions of invisible 
DD (e.g., sexual orientation, political viewpoint, etc.), and increasingly collabo-
rate on research without having met in person; for instance, via online platforms or 
social networks  (see  also Zoom and the Covid-19 context) where various cues of 
social identity salient in personal interactions can more easily go unnoticed (Code 
and Zaparyniuk 2009; Van Noorden 2014; Gilson et al. 2015). Furthermore, while 
members of DDS groups might reveal their invisible social identities (and find out 
about each other’s demographic differences) via their contributions  to the group, 
often group members won’t be certain about each other’s sexual orientation, reli-
gious or political identity, and so on: if these DD dimensions were easily detected, 
they wouldn’t be considered dimensions of invisible diversity in the first place. And, 
importantly, there is evidence that many scientists deliberately and successfully con-
ceal aspects of their invisible social identities (Shields and Dunn 2016; Barres 2018; 
Peters et al. 2020). To precisely the same extent that invisible DD is real, namely 
frequently, partial (vs. specific) DD detection is not only relevant but also feasible. 
For there will then frequently be cases when steering committees of DDS groups 
may either leave hidden  some DD dimensions that are currently not detected by 
group members, or make them more salient.
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Objection 3 The partial DD detection approach suggests that, in some cases, in DDS 
groups, scientists’ opportunities for specific DD detection should be limited. This, 
however, is unacceptable: some scientists might want to be open about and have oth-
ers notice, for instance, their LGBTQ+, religious, political, etc. identity. Attempting 
to prevent this interferes with their basic right of self-expression.
Response The partial DD detection approach is primarily about whether or not to 
take measures to remove an existing lack of awareness of diversity within groups 
either moderately (i.e., partial DD detection) or extensively (i.e., specific DD detec-
tion). It is not necessarily also about whether to deprive group members of an other-
wise for them easily attainable awareness of their diversity – let alone prevent them 
from expressing their social identity if they wish to do so. Having said that, suppose 
the members of a DDS group are informed about the above-mentioned considera-
tions on the epistemically negative effects of social categorization in the context of 
DD detection. It isn’t unreasonable to assume that these scientists may then them-
selves, aware of the pernicious effects of their own implicit biases and stereotypes, 
want to adopt policies at work that help them  avoid revealing their own invisible 
individual-specific social identities and detecting each other’s. As part of that effort, 
they might ask the group’s steering committee for assistance.  This may result in 
their adoption of the partial DD detection approach and in limitations of their oppor-
tunities for specific DD detection that are fully compatible with respecting the sci-
entists’ right to express (and be perceived as) who they are. Only these and related 
consent-involving cases of limiting scientists’ insights into their group’s diversity 
are at issue here.
Objection 4 Hindering scientists in DDS groups from full disclosure of their invis-
ible social identities so as to undercut the epistemic costs of specific DD detection is 
both unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. For the problem of intergroup 
biases that the partial DD detection approach is meant to avoid could alternatively 
and simply be solved by introducing social norms in DDS groups that encourage tol-
erance towards different sexual orientation, religious, political etc. identities among 
scientists. Indeed, preventing the detection of these identities reduces scientists’ 
opportunities to develop this tolerance at their work place: to become more toler-
ant, one needs to be exposed to and notice different social identities so as to receive 
corrective, stereotype-disconfirming evidence. The partial DD detection approach 
thus seems to undermine attempts to fight biases and stereotypes.
Response Unfortunately, specific social norms encouraging tolerance and social 
justice in DDS groups are perhaps unlikely to effectively keep, for instance, implicit 
biases and stereotyping in check. This is because these cognitions operate largely 
outside a subject’s awareness and direct control. Adding to the problem, with respect 
to many of the demographic dimensions at issue here, for instance, one’s political 
orientation, such norms would perhaps also be in tension with the moral framework 
that scientists encounter outside of academia. For example, while bias and discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender or ethnicity are in Western societies criticized – indeed 
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illegal – when ‘hard’ scientists disrespect ‘soft’ scientists (Kirby et  al. 2019), 
or when liberal scientists are hostile towards their conservative fellows and vice 
versa (Honeycutt and Freberg 2017), typically no strong criticism occurs (in fact, 
it’s sometimes viewed as “appropriate”, see Iyengar et al. 2019: 133). That is, the 
intergroup aversion, hierarchical thinking, and existence of social fault-lines at issue 
here seem generally more tolerated (Guimond et al. 2003). This doesn’t preclude the 
potential effectiveness of DDS-group specific social norms in constraining many of 
the intergroup biases highlighted above. But it does raise doubts about such norms’ 
efficacy.
Moreover, when the partial DD detection approach involves preventing the detec-
tion of invisible, individual-specific social identities, this might indeed reduce group 
members’ opportunities to develop tolerance towards these social identities. But 
notice that the approach is also explicitly aimed at reducing the harm (epistemic 
or otherwise) of social biases and stereotypes: just as the common procedure of 
blinding CVs so that applicant names can’t trigger unconscious gender and/or race 
biases skewing decision-making, ‘blinding’ DDS groups so that their members can’t 
detect certain social-identity cues of each other is meant to undercut interferences 
by unconscious biases and stereotypes and to facilitate egalitarian responding. That 
is, the partial DD detection approach in fact itself also helps directly counteract the 
pernicious influence of biases and stereotypes.
8  Conclusion
I have argued that while DD can be epistemically beneficial even if it doesn’t involve 
CD, the epistemic benefits at issue depend on DD detection in different ways than 
assumed in recent work on diversity. Steel et al. (2019) suggest that DD detection 
might yield CD-independent epistemic benefits via triggering stereotype-based CD 
expectations. In response, I provided reasons to assume that DD detection impli-
cating stereotyping is in fact  likely to weaken epistemic group performance. Fur-
thermore, while Carter and Phillips (2017) hold that DD detection can only result 
in CD-independent epistemic benefits if it involves social categorization specific 
enough for in-group vs. out-group distinctions and similarity-attraction, I argued 
against this. The kind of epistemic benefits at issue can result when group mem-
bers only display partial DD detection, i.e., when they only have a general insight 
into the DD of their group such that they understand that the group is demographi-
cally diverse in many ways but can’t yet socially categorize each other with respect 
to their particular demographic features. Relating the distinction between specific 
and partial DD detection to scientific groups, I then proposed that in one common 
kind of demographically diverse groups in science, specific DD detection is likely 
to create epistemic costs. I suggested that, in contrast, partial DD detection helps 
avoid these costs and can also produce epistemic benefits. This point provides an 
epistemic reason for context-dependent limitations on scientists’ insight into the 
diversity of their group. While this reason is defeasible and may be outweighed by 
1 3
European Journal for Philosophy of Science           (2021) 11:33  Page 19 of 21    33 
other considerations, it should be taken into account when analyzing the epistemic 
impact of diversity, especially when considering groups with invisible diversity in 
which members might remain largely hidden figures to each other.
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